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The Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) in May 
2019 upheld the International Association of 
Athletics Federation’s (IAAF) regulation for 
testosterone testing of athletes with disorders of 
sexual development (DSD), a ruling later 
supported by the findings of the Swiss Supreme Court.[1] As a 
result, a prominent female athlete, Caster Semenya, will not be 
allowed to compete unless her testosterone level is brought 
within typical female levels. The IAAF acknowledged an element 
of discrimination but held that this was a ‘necessary, reasonable 
and proportionate means of achieving the legitimate objective of 
ensuring fair competition in female athletics in certain events.’ 
Similarly, the Swiss Supreme Court found that Semenya’s DSD 
‘has a direct impact on performance in sport, which could never 
be achieved by other women,’ [2] despite the lack of extensive 
studies and the uncertainty of whether elevated endogenous 
testosterone levels actually do give an unfair competitive 
advantage in DSD women.[3] This paper will not engage with the 
specifics of the CAS’s ruling or the IAAF’s policy, but will rather 
employ a teleological construct to examine the legitimacy of a 
female athlete with DSD competing as a female. Similarly, the 
paper does not address the question of transgenderism in sports, 
though there certainly may be instances of athletes with DSD who 
also identify as transgender. These authors are solely concerned 
with biological sex and not sociological gender. 
 
 
Discussion  
Firstly, a conspicuous premise needs justification: the existence 
of only two sexes. Every human organ is oriented towards 
specific purposes: a heart for pumping blood, eyes for seeing, 
and lungs for breathing. The sexual arrangement of the human 
body also has a biological purpose; it is oriented towards 
human reproduction. However, unlike other human organ 
systems (e.g. the cardiovascular system), one individual 
possesses only half of the necessary structures to complete the 
reproductive system’s function. A female and a male must 
come together to complete the sexual apparatus. Thus a female 
is one whose body is oriented towards physiological 
motherhood, while a male is one whose body is oriented 
towards physiological fatherhood. These definitions are not 
simplistically reduced to the difference between male and 
female gonads, producing large and small gametes, 
respectively, but also by the males and females distinct 
arrangements to conceive, protect and nourish children. 
Humans cannot reproduce on their own, nor does reproduction 
require three (or more) unique participants. A species where an 
individual could reproduce on its own, e.g. earthworm, can be 
considered to have one sex. If a species evolved which featured 
the necessary reproductive components divided into three 
discrete units (with members of this species each possessing 
one of these units), that species would have three sexes. 
Human sexual organisation, though, is not reducible to 
gonads, because if gonads are not present in an individual, one 
can still discern the purpose of that person’s sexual 
organisation. Analogously, manned rockets are designed for 
spaceflight. By looking at the rocket’s design one can perceive 
this purpose – even if the rocket’s engines are removed or were 
never installed. If a car’s engine was bolted onto the rocket, it 
would still be a rocket and not a car. The rocket may not be 
capable of spaceflight without properly functioning engines, 
but its purpose is still space travel, and it is still a rocket. 
Similarly, a person’s sex is an inherent part of that person, even 
if the gonads are defective or absent – although gonads remain 
the fundamental means of achieving the purpose of the 
reproductive system (like the engines of a rocket).  
Some contend that those with DSD belong to a spectrum 
between male and female.[4] However, owing to the nature of 
human reproduction, there is no meaningful category that can 
exist between male and female.  [5] Moreover all human foetuses 
begin on a default path to become female, a path that is only 
diverted if a sufficient biochemical cascade is both transmitted 
and received properly within the foetus. DSD occurs when this 
signal is inappropriately transmitted or received (e.g. an XY 
foetus with complete androgen insensitivity (CAIS), will 
In mid-2019, the controversy regarding South African runner 
Caster Semenya’s eligibility to participate in competitions 
against other female runners culminated in a Court of 
Arbitration for Sport judgement.  Semenya possessed high 
endogenous testosterone levels (arguably a performance 
advantage), secondary to a disorder of sexual development. In 
this commentary, Aristotelean teleology is used to defend the 
existence of ‘male’ and ‘female’ as discrete categories.  It is 
argued that once the athlete’s sex is established, they should be 
allowed to compete in the category of their sex without 
obligatory medical treatment. Indeed, other athletes who 
possess advantageous genetic or phenotypic traits that fall 
outside of the human norm have been allowed to compete as 
humans without restraint. In both cases, if an athlete possesses 
the essential attributes of being a human or being male or female 
they should be permitted to compete in those respective 
categories; athletes’ eligibilities should not be based upon 
accidental attributes.  
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develop as a female). In DSD cases, discerning whether a baby 
is male or female can be difficult, but this merely highlights that 
pathology – not sex – exists on a spectrum, one defined by 
severity. 
DSD is no different from any other embryological 
pathology.[5] No spectrum of orientations exists for the human 
heart, despite the numerous possible abnormalities (e.g. 
Tetralogy of Fallot). Rather, there is a spectrum of pathologies 
that can alter the heart’s ability to fulfil its purpose. The same 
is true of DSD. Suppose a person was born with a chimeric XX 
and XY genotype, and sufficient XY cells existed in one of the 
indifferent gonads for that gonad to become a testis. If that 
testis secreted sufficient testosterone in the crucial sexual 
differentiation window to orient the baby towards fatherhood 
and away from the default reproductive system’s path towards 
motherhood, that individual will be male – even if the other 
gonad has the XX genotype and became an ovary.  
On the other hand, an XY individual with CAIS is a female 
whose body is organised around motherhood 
(notwithstanding that she would have non-functioning 
testicles in her abdomen). Embryologically, her body never 
received the androgen signal necessary to divert her away from 
the default female path.[5,6] Just like the rocket previously 
mentioned, without the proper engine, her body still possesses 
and manifests a certain organisational character towards 
motherhood, even though her defunct gonads (undescended 
testes) are a male characteristic. Her DSD pathology has 
obstructed the organisational purpose of her reproductive 
system – i.e. functioning ovaries and uterus – but that purpose 
is still present. It is evident that lacking an ovary or uterus does 
not nullify someone’s femaleness; a cancer patient who has 
undergone hysterosalpingo-oophorectomy is still a woman. 
Although perhaps counter-intuitive, a person’s sex is not 
defined by gonads, since the absence or removal of gonads (a 
not uncommon procedure for females) does not annihilate 
one’s sex.  
In teleological terms, ovaries or uteruses are accidental (albeit 
typical) female properties, and testicles are accidental male 
properties. Similar to the hysterosalpingo-oophorectomy case, 
a soldier whose testicles were destroyed in a bomb blast is still 
a male even though he can no longer reproduce. The bomb blast 
and cancer have hindered the reproductive systems from 
achieving their purpose but have not made the man ‘un-male’ 
and the woman ‘un-female’.  
In human sports, aside from athletic prowess (and the 
possible addition of a specific weight), there are two 
fundamental entry requirements for participation: the 
participant must be human and belong to the sex in which they 
compete. It is vital that an individual’s eligibility to compete is 
only judged according to these categories. Platypuses do not 
participate in human swimming competitions because they are 
a different species, defined by different essential 
characteristics. However, a human swimmer with webbed feet, 
somewhat resembling those of a platypus, is no less human and 
more of a platypus because of them. Webbed feet are an 
accidental feature in humans, having no bearing on a human’s 
essential attributes, and thus should have no bearing on 
someone’s eligibility to compete as a human.  
The same is true of sex. If someone is by essence a female, 
they should not be required to change their accidental features 
that are intrinsic to them as individuals to compete. There are 
only two reasonable alternatives, aside from eliminating sex as 
a category altogether. The first is to devise some complex 
algorithm to impose a handicap on performance based on 
genotypic and phenotypic traits. The second is for sports bodies 
to require corrective steps for every competitively 
advantageous trait, from webbed toes to gigantism. Yet there 
are no calls for male athletes with advantageous traits, like 
Michael Phelps or Gheorghe Mureșan, to undergo corrective 
procedures. Additionally, doing nothing is often a genuine 
medical option. Perhaps as a solution, every athlete with 
atypical attributes could be required to receive corrective 
treatment if that treatment is deemed safer than or as safe as no 
treatment, as it may be in Semenya’s case (despite the dearth of 
evidence on the trait’s advantageousness),[3] but not in 
Gheorghe Mureșan’s case. However, these solutions seem 
infinitely complicated and only stand to make the process of 
determining ‘fair play’ hopelessly controversial.   
Sport is not just about who trains harder, although tenacity 
and perseverance certainly play an integral role. Sporting 
prowess is also critically influenced by a set of genetic traits. 
How men and women capitalise on or overcome their inborn 
traits is a significant dynamic of high-performance athletics. In 
an era that ostensibly celebrates individual differences and 
fighting stereotypes, it would seem odd to punish athletes for 
possessing traits that, while arguably advantageous, have no 
essential bearing on their eligibility to compete. These authors 
submit that DSD athletes should be allowed to compete within 
the sex category to which they belong by essence, with 
whatever advantages or disadvantages they were born with. 
 
Conclusion  
Since the CAF and IAAF judgments did not question 
Semenya’s sex, the proposal of these authors would ensure that 
she was treated with the same standard as other athletes with 
intrinsic advantages. 
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